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Hukou and Health Insurance Coverage 
for Migrant Workers 
Armin MÜLLER 
Abstract: Most migrant workers in mainland China are officially 
covered by the New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS), a 
rural health insurance system that operates in their home communi-
ties. The NRCMS and the system of household registration (ᡧਓ, 
hukou) are tightly linked and systemically interdependent institutions. 
Migrant workers have difficulties benefitting from this social protec-
tion because it remains spatially separated from them. Only a minori-
ty have access to urban health insurance systems. This paper sheds 
light on the institutional origins of the coverage problem of migrant 
workers and examines crucial policy initiatives that attempt to solve 
it. In the context of the ongoing hukou reforms, these policies aim to 
partially dissolve the systemic interdependence of hukou and health 
insurance. While the policies provide feasible, yet conflict-prone, 
solutions in short-distance and concentrated bilateral migration sys-
tems, covering migrants who cross provincial boundaries remains a 
challenge. 
 Manuscript received 9 January 2015; accepted 17 September 2015 
Keywords: China, health insurance, New Rural Cooperative Medical 
System, migrant workers, hukou 
Dr. Armin Müller is a postdoctoral fellow at the Chair of Society 
and Economy of Modern China at the University of Göttingen. He 
completed his PhD at the Research Training Group “Risk and East 
Asia” (DFG GK 1613) of the University of Duisburg-Essen about 
the introduction of health insurance in rural China. Afterwards, he 
joined the Transnational Studies Initiative at Harvard University to 
work on Transnational Social Protection. Since May 2015, he has 
been a postdoc fellow at the Chair of Society and Economy of China 
at the University of Göttingen. His research interests include China’s 
healthcare and social security, local governments, public finances, 
migration and education. 
E-mail: <armin.mueller@sowi.uni-goettingen.de> 
  54 Armin Müller 

Introduction 
China’s economy and society are changing fast. Large parts of the 
population are on the move, but the institutional structures governing 
this population are only inertly and gradually adapting to this change. 
In 2013 the estimated number of rural-to-urban migrants, the so-
called “migrant workers” (ߌ≁ᐕ , nongmingong), was 268.9 million 
(China Market Research 2014). Most of these individuals remain tied 
to their native localities by a system of household registration known 
as hukou (ᡧਓ), which institutionalises the urban/rural divide: a cen-
tral social cleavage in Chinese society. Even though migrant workers 
reside in urban areas, they often have difficulties integrating into ur-
ban society, and the organs of the state treat them largely as rural 
citizens (Whyte 2010). This paper explores the mutual dependence 
between the hukou system and health insurance, and how it relates to 
the health insurance coverage of migrant workers. 
Up until the early years of this century, most rural citizens had 
no health insurance, and only a few migrant workers were covered by 
urban social insurance systems. In 2002 the Chinese government 
introduced a largely tax-funded health insurance system for the rural 
population, the New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS; ᯠ
රߌᶁਸ֌५⯇ , xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao), which had officially 
reached a coverage level of 99 per cent of the rural population by 
2013 (Chinese Government 2014). In this system, villagers pay pre-
miums, which are subsidised by the higher levels of government on a 
per capita basis. The NRCMS is strongly decentralised: its funds are 
usually managed and pooled at the county level by the local bureaus 
of health, which also manage the local county hospitals and township 
health centres – the main health providers approved for NRCMS 
reimbursement. Most migrant workers should in theory be covered 
by the NRCMS. 
The current literature on health insurance for migrant workers 
focuses largely on their integration into urban systems of health in-
surance. This article takes a translocal perspective and explores the 
role of the sending localities in social protection (cf.: Levitt and Schil-
ler 2004). It analyses migrant workers’ position in China’s fragment-
ed, decentralised health insurance system and is structured around 
three leading research questions: first, why do China’s systems of 
household registration and health insurance marginalise migrant 
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workers? Second, how do central and local policy initiatives try to 
improve insurance coverage for migrant workers? And third, what are 
the limitations of these approaches in the context of a changing hukou 
system? While the existing literature has largely focused on migrant 
workers’ health insurance coverage in urban destination areas, this 
study focuses on the rural sending areas and rural health insurance. 
The conceptual framework of this article is focused on the idea 
of systemic interdependence, which aims to turn core insights of 
Luhmann’s functional structuralism into fertile input for actor-
centred institutional theory. Systemic interdependence is a crucial 
characteristic of the institutional contexts of governing, defined as 
“relationships of mutual dependence and influence between different 
institutions or simultaneous processes” (Mayntz 2009: 92). This in-
terdependence is based on the structural complexity of modern socie-
ties, most notably their internal differentiation into functional con-
texts of action, along with the multilevel hierarchies of their state 
organisations. Complexity facilitates parametric links between institu-
tions, which can mutually influence their respective determining fac-
tors. Institutional structures can have either beneficial or corruptive 
effects on other institutions or social processes (Mayntz et al. 1988; 
Mayntz 2002, 2009). 
The analysis focuses on the systemic interdependence between 
the NRCMS and the hukou system. The NRCMS was the first in a 
series of largely tax-funded social protection programmes launched 
by the central government since 2000. This welfare expansion was 
achieved with the hukou system as an institutional foundation: the 
urban/rural divide and the decentralisation embodied in the hukou 
scheme stabilised a system of different levels of public welfare spend-
ing on urban and rural citizens (cf.: Kong 2010). The static categories 
of the hukou system that tie much of the population to rural areas and 
their home communities increasingly contradict the dynamic process-
ses of urbanisation and industrialisation, which require a greater mo-
bility of the population and further undermine the capacity of the 
family as an institutional basis of social protection (Hussain 2007). At 
the same time, the hukou system is changing dynamically: the urban/ 
rural divide is increasingly being abolished in a local context. This 
exerts pressure on the newly built institutions of social protection to 
adapt. 
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Parallel to welfare expansion, a process of functional differentia-
tion is proceeding at the administrative level. This increases the com-
patibility of social protection systems with the dynamic development 
processes and lays the foundations for overcoming the urban/rural 
divide at the programme level. In the 1980s and 1990s, the adminis-
trative jurisdiction for social protection was based on the urban/rural 
divide: the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
were in charge of rural social protection programmes; while the urban 
social insurance system was placed under the jurisdiction of the Min-
istry of Labour and Social Security, which became the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security (MoHRSS) in 2008. Functional 
differentiation has proceeded in a series of reform steps, in which 
jurisdiction over public insurance programmes was gradually central-
ised at the MoHRSS – including the NRCMS in 2013 (State Council 
2013). In contrast, social assistance programmes are under the juris-
diction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. While functional differentia-
tion has progressed at the administrative level, the urban/rural divide 
remains a structural principle at the programme level; however, this 
differentiation decreases the pressure to adapt. 
This paper1 will not analyse the historical process but will instead 
investigate the resulting systemic interdependence between health 
insurance and hukou; the problems that emerge from this interde-
pendence; and ongoing local and central policy initiatives to cope 
with these problems. The argument thus consists of two parts, the 
first being that the systemic interdependence between hukou, on the 
one hand, and social protection and health insurance, on the other, 
undermines the coverage of migrant workers by both urban and rural 
programmes. When people move, their household registration stays 
in the place they came from, the sending area, and this often means 
that they are entitled to social protection in a place where they cannot 
use it. The next two sections of this paper present this first part of 
the argument, and the section thereafter provides a review of the 
existing literature on migrant workers’ health insurance. After that, 
the second part of the argument delineates that local experiments 
generate policy adaptations to restore health insurance coverage for 

1 The author would like to thank the German Research Foundation (DFG GK 
1613) for its financial support and is indebted to Peggy Levitt, Jocelyn Viterna, 
Flemming Christiansen, Thomas Heberer, and Martin K. Whyte for their ad-
vice and constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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migrant workers, and that these adaptations can overcome the sys-
temic interdependence to some extent, but may also cause substantial 
conflicts of interest between different bureaucratic actors. The diffi-
culties for the migrants increase corresponding to the rising adminis-
trative levels of the boundaries they cross during migration, which 
facilitates local and, to a lesser extent, regional solutions, but leaves 
interprovincial migrants largely uncovered. The last section presents 
the conclusions. 
This study relies on various sources of data, including semi-struc-
tured interviews and grey literature collected during four research 
stays in China in 2010, 2011, and 2014. Fieldwork was mainly con-
ducted in the rural and urban areas of four larger urban centres in 
Eastern, Central, and Western China. Furthermore, the paper relies 
on expert interviews with Chinese academics, a series of internal re-
ports from the research organs of the State Council and the Ministry 
of Health (MoH), and a recorded speech from a conference in China. 
The author also consulted administrative documents and Chinese 
academic publications for additional data. Chinese statistics on the 
number of migrant workers are estimates. This study uses them main-
ly to illustrate the relative size of different groups of migrant workers 
and does not interpret them as fully accurate in the absolute numbers. 
T City in Inner Mongolia, where fieldwork was conducted for 
eight days during August and September 2011, is analysed as a case 
study and described in more detail later in the article. The evidence 
from other field sites largely provides examples of the interdepend-
ence of institutions. The analytical value here is less dependent on the 
specific local context, but some background information is given in 
the text. Fieldwork was conducted in C District of H City in Hubei 
Province for eight days in late 2011, in Z City and its D County in 
Shandong Province for four days in late 2010, and in A County in 
Jiangsu Province for eight days in 2011. Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted mainly with representatives of the local health ad-
ministration, with the staff of county hospitals and township health 
centres, and with village doctors. Informal interviews with villagers 
were conducted in the absence of cadres where possible. 
The cases discussed in this article are highly relevant for the cur-
rent and ongoing reforms of the NRCMS and the hukou system, even 
though the data was collected several years ago, and some literature-
based cases discussed in this paper are even older. T City, C District, 
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and A County were all above-average cases in terms of state capacity 
and policy development. By the time of data collection, they were not 
representative of China, but could be considered as “advanced” 
compared to most other localities. Such localities often piloted the 
policy initiatives that are currently being promoted by the central 
government – for instance, abolishing the distinction between agricul-
tural and non-agricultural hukou, or centralising the NRCMS at the 
city level (NHFPC and MoF 2013; State Council 2014). The experi-
ences of these pioneers are thus of crucial importance for the current 
extension of these policies. 
Systemic Interdependence: Hukou, Migration, 
and Social Protection 
The systemic interdependence between hukou and social protection in 
the context of China’s decentralised polity is a crucial structural de-
terminant of migrants’ social protection problems. The hukou system 
provides the administrative foundation for social protection: financial 
transfers for tax-financed services are largely allocated on the basis of 
hukou, which also defines in what locality a citizen is entitled to public 
services and social protection, and whether this entitlement concerns 
rural or urban programmes (Wang 2011). Social protection and public 
service provision, therefore, reinforce hukou as a factor of social strati-
fication, which supports a system of inherited inequality that largely 
marginalises migrant workers. At the same time, the hukou system 
remains in a constant process of change and adaptation: the recent 
policies of the central government aim to abolish the institutionalised 
cleavage between urban and rural society and to improve migrant 
workers’ integration into urban society and urban systems of social 
protection (State Council 2014). Provided that there is a rigid and 
thorough implementation, these reforms will exert substantial pres-
sure on health insurance systems for adaptation in the coming years. 
As a basis of social protection, the hukou system, first and fore-
most, defines the administrative category of “household” and assigns 
each individual to one administrative household. Second, it distin-
guishes between two types of hukou: agricultural and non-agricultural, 
according to which a household is assigned to either the rural or the 
urban part of society. This differentiation is being phased out gradu-
ally. The hukou locality connects households to their constituent 
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members’ place of legal residence, and this feature is very likely to 
endure. The hukou system also provides an information mechanism 
for the central government about the number of people living within 
its territory and their place of residence. Even though hukou figures 
are often inaccurate, they still serve as an accounting basis for fiscal 
transfers for public service provision and social protection. Such 
transfers are of considerable importance for local governments, 
which often struggle with massive fiscal imbalances (Chan and Buck-
ingham 2008; Chan and Zhang 1999; Wang 2011). 
The systemic interdependence between largely tax-funded social 
protection and hukou is multidimensional. At the programme level, 
there are separate social protection systems for urban and rural resi-
dents – for example, in health insurance, pension insurance, and so-
cial assistance. First, hukou determines the target beneficiary: pro-
grammes are directed at households rather than individuals; they 
assign agricultural households to rural programmes and non-agricul-
tural households to urban programmes. Second, financial resources 
are allocated accordingly. In other words, the financial transfers by 
the central, provincial, and city governments are carried out only for 
eligible populations. Third, access to public service units for service 
provision is often restricted to the home locality: villagers insured in 
the NRCMS, for example, are usually expected to seek treatment at 
their local village doctor or township hospital first, rather than going 
to an urban hospital directly. Fourth, financial services, such as reim-
bursements, pensions, or social assistance, can often be claimed and 
received only at the place of registration. At the administrative level, 
jurisdiction over urban and rural programmes can be divided between 
different line bureaucracies. These dimensions affect different pro-
grammes to differing degrees. Health insurance was arguably the last 
field in which administrative separation was practised, and it is cur-
rently being phased out. Overall, however, tax-funded social protec-
tion programmes remain closely tied to hukou. 
Formal rural-to-urban migration, including a legal change of 
“residency,” is a complicated process with multiple stakeholders. It 
can include both the change of the hukou status from agricultural to 
non-agricultural, and the change of the hukou locality. The regulatory 
competence for specifying the quantitative and qualitative conditions 
for in-migration has been largely decentralised in recent years. Access 
to small- and medium-sized cities has been eased for migrants, 
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whereas large cities continue to restrict access. In order to transfer 
hukou from one place to another, a household or individual needs the 
consent and cooperation of government departments in both the 
sending and receiving areas (Chan and Zhang 1999; Davies and 
Ramia 2008; State Council 2014). 
Non-hukou migration benefits many local governments in the 
sending and receiving areas. Large and prosperous urban centres 
continue to use hukou as a filter mechanism, granting preferential 
access to groups like wealthy investors or skilled workers. Unskilled 
workers provide a source of cheap labour for the urban industries, 
while the social privileges of the local urban population can be pro-
tected, and public expenditure on the social integration of migrants 
remains low. For local governments in the sending areas, non-hukou 
migration directs remittances into their local economies, while at the 
same time allowing them to uphold their claim to hukou-based fiscal 
transfers. While the specific incentive structures can vary substantially 
between different localities, local governments in urban and rural 
China often benefit from the social marginalisation of migrant work-
ers (Chan and Buckingham 2008; Davies and Ramia 2008; Wang 
2011). 
A large share of internal migrants in China, thus, remains a 
“floating” population (⍱ࣘӪਓ, liudong renkou). They move, but leave 
their household registrations and entitlements to social protection 
behind, and thus fall through the gaps in the system. Of an estimated 
268.9 million migrant workers in 2013, 102.8 million remained within 
their locality of registration (ᵜൠߌ≁ᐕ, bendi nongmingong). Of the 
166.1 million floating migrant workers (ཆࠪߌ≁ᐕ , waichu nong-
mingong), 88.7 million remained within the boundaries of their home 
province, while 77.4 million crossed provincial boundaries. Where 
social entitlements remained restricted to the locality, those who left 
could use these entitlements only as a fallback option upon return 
(Chan and Buckingham 2008; China Market Research 2014). 
In the destination areas, only a small share of the migrant work-
ers was able to integrate into urban society and get access to social 
protection. Most notably, the level of skills they brought with them 
was often insufficient to access the formal labour market and enter 
stable, well-paid employment relations. Only 35.3 million of the float-
ing migrants took their families with them to their destination areas  
(Ѯᇦཆࠪ, jujia waichu), which is an indicator of stable employment 
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and the wish to integrate into urban society (Han, Jin, and He 2011). 
The vast majority (130.9 million) pursued a split-household strategy  
(տᡧѝཆࠪ, zhuhu zhong waichu), in that they left (part of) their family 
behind and engaged in circular migration between two or more places. 
The sending area remained the centre of their lives and their interest 
in a formal hukou transfer or urban social insurance was often limited, 
especially with regard to non-portable pensions (China Market Re-
search 2014; Jin 2011; Wang 2011; Zhu and Lin 2011). 
Fragmented Health Insurance and the
Coverage of Internal Migrants 
China currently operates three large public health insurance systems, 
which are directed towards different parts of the population. The 
Urban Employees Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI, ෾䭷㙼ᐕสᵜ
५⯇؍䲙, chengzhen zhigong jiben yiliao baoxian) is part of a social insur-
ance system established in the 1990s that also includes pension insur-
ance, unemployment insurance, maternity insurance, and industrial 
accident insurance. In recent years, two largely tax-funded health 
insurance systems have been established to cover the remaining popu-
lation: the NRCMS, which was introduced in 2003 for the rural popu-
lation; and the Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI, ෾
䭷ት≁สᵜ५⯇؍䲙, chengzhen jumin jiben yiliao baoxian), which was 
introduced in 2007 for urban residents not covered by social insur-
ance. Some key facts about the three systems are summarised in  
Table 1. In addition to these, various localities have also created their 
own insurance systems, which may complement, integrate, or replace 
any of the three main systems. Furthermore, commercial insurance 
companies offer individual and complementary health insurance con-
tracts. Statistical figures about coverage are, however, contradictory, 
and the figures presented here might include a substantial number of 
“double insurances” – referring to people who are registered in more 
than one system either by accident or due to fraudulent activities (cf.: 
MoH 2012: 73; NHFPC 2013: 344–348). 
From a legal perspective, migrant workers are required to have a 
labour contract and participate in the UEBMI (Darimont 2010). But, 
in 2013, only 46.7 million migrant workers were covered by the 
UEBMI. According to central administrative guidelines, migrant 
workers not covered by the UEBMI should be allowed to choose 
  62 Armin Müller 

between the NRCMS and the URBMI (State Council 2009). The 
hukou-based URBMI has been opened up to migrant workers in some 
cities (Yip et al. 2012) and, as of 2013, the overall number of migrants 
insured under this scheme was 3.5 million. NRCMS coverage among 
rural populations officially reached 99 per cent in 2013, including 
migrant workers. The NRCMS is, therefore, arguably the most im-
portant health insurance system for migrant workers (Chinese Gov-
ernment 2014). 
Table 1. The Basic Characteristics of China’s Three Main Public Health 
Insurance Systems 
 UEBMI URBMI NRCMS 
Target population Formal employees Urban citizens Rural citizens 
Financing Employers’ and 
employees’  
contributions 
Premiums and 
tax-funded 
contributions 
Premiums and 
tax-funded  
contributions 
Population  
coverage 2012 
19.6% 20.0% 59.5% 
Introduction 1998 2007 2002 
Institutional basis Labour contract Hukou Hukou 
Source: NHFPC 2013. 
The existing academic literature has strongly focused on the integra-
tion of migrant workers into urban insurance systems. Nielsen and 
colleagues (2005) found various factors to have a positive effect on 
the social insurance coverage of migrant workers: employment in 
state-owned enterprises; being skilled and having stable, long-term 
employment relations; and migrating within the home province. 
There is a strong institutional connection between social insurance 
coverage, formal labour contracts, and employment in the public 
sector (Cheng, Nielsen, and Smyth 2014; Gao, Yang, and Li 2012; 
Davies and Ramia 2008; Zhu and Lin 2011). 
Some major in-migration cities have initiated special health in-
surance programmes for migrant workers. Pioneers in this direction 
were the cities of Shanghai and Chengdu, which initiated such pro-
grammes in 2002 and 2003, respectively (Darimont 2010). Shenzhen 
started a similar system in 2005 (Mou et al. 2009). Zhao and col-
leagues (2011) found the Shanghai Migrant Worker Health Insurance 
system had achieved only 36.5 per cent coverage within their sample, 
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even though membership of the system was formally mandatory for 
all migrant workers. Coverage depended largely on the employer, 
many of whom were reluctant to pay for coverage before the work 
relationship had stabilised. The administrative bureau in charge of the 
insurance system was understaffed and lacked the administrative 
authority to penalise employers. Furthermore, among those who fell 
sick, only a few seemed to actually receive reimbursements from the 
system. 
The vast majority of migrant workers are, or should be, enrolled 
with the NRCMS, but comparatively little is known about the details 
of this coverage. Survey-based studies found NRCMS coverage 
among migrant workers to be about 70 per cent in Shanghai in 2010 
and less than 50 per cent in Fuzhou in 2009 (Zhao, Rao, and Zhang 
2011; Zhu and Lin 2011). This is low compared to the quasi-universal 
enrolment indicated by official statistics. Furthermore, both types of 
figures may be distorted: Chinese NGOs report that migrants are 
often unaware of their insurance status and the over-reporting of 
NRCMS enrollees by local governments has been criticised by the 
central government (MoF and MoH 2009; WHO 2010). 
The NRCMS remains very tightly coupled to hukou and thus 
primarily targets the population with an agricultural household regis-
tration residing at its place of origin. The systemic interdependence 
between the NRCMS and hukou defines the household, rather than 
the individual, as the unit of participation (Anonymous 10 2011; State 
Council 2003). Furthermore, it usually leads to the automatic assign-
ment of the rural population to the NRCMS. In C District, for exam-
ple, only agricultural households were eligible for enrolment (Ano-
nymous 7 2011). Where the distinction between agricultural and non-
agricultural hukou was abolished (as it was, for example, in Chong-
qing), a local hukou remains the condition for enrolment (Chongqing 
Government 2007). In 2007 only 0.94 per cent of NRCMS enrollees 
(6.75 million) did not have an agricultural hukou (Fu and Wang 2009). 
Migrants covered by an urban insurance programme are officially not 
required to enrol in the NRCMS and those who migrate with their 
entire household are unlikely to pay premiums in their rural homes 
(Han, Jin, and He 2011; Anonymous 11 2011; State Council 2009). 
But usually, when a migrant is not ready to enrol, the entire house-
hold loses NRCMS coverage. 
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Hukou figures determine how much in financial transfers for the 
NRCMS a locality can receive from higher levels of government. In T 
City, for example, the floating population from outside its jurisdiction 
was allowed into the local NRCMS, but they had to pay the com-
bined amount of premiums and state transfers, whereas locals had to 
pay only premiums. The link between hukou and enrolment seems to 
be weaker in Eastern China, where central transfers are less im-
portant. The eastern counties studied here both allowed non-agricul-
tural populations into the NRCMS: D County had abolished the divi-
sion of agricultural and non-agricultural hukou and A County mainly 
integrated workers in township enterprises (Anonymous 2 2010; 
Anonymous 11 2011). Of the 330 counties that allowed non-agricul-
tural households to enrol in the NRCMS in 2007, 208 were located in 
Eastern China (Fu and Wang 2009).  
The revenues and expenditures of the insurance funds were 
tightly linked to the hukou system as well. Enrolment rates and targets 
for premium collection were often calculated based on hukou figures 
(Anonymous 7 2011). Reimbursements could be claimed only at the 
designated organ in the locality of registration, and hukou registration 
booklets were often one of the proofs of eligibility that rural house-
holds were required to present when claiming reimbursement. In a 
more indirect fashion, the network of approved healthcare providers 
(ᇊ⛩५⯇ᵪᶴ, dingdian yiliao jigou) was usually limited to the home 
county. The services of non-approved providers were either not eli-
gible for reimbursement or were eligible only at reduced reimburse-
ment rates (State Council 2003; Anonymous 4 2011; Anonymous 6 
2011; Anonymous 7 2011). 
In addition, the administration of the various health insurance 
systems was separated along the urban/rural divide: the MoH and its 
line bureaucracy were in charge of the NRCMS and the rural popula-
tion, and the MoHRSS was in charge of the urban population. At the 
local-state level, cases of double insurance due to overlaps in pro-
grammes’ target populations and the processes of urbanisation could 
cause problems. In C District, for example, some farmers switched 
from agricultural to non-agricultural hukou in the course of urbanisa-
tion. Some of them managed to illegally obtain two hukou registration 
booklets and used them to enrol in both the URBMI and the 
NRCMS. The exchange of information between different depart-
ments is generally a problem in China and, in this case, neither had 
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access to the hukou data of the bureau of public security. However, 
both departments compared samples from their respective lists and 
were thus able to identify a few hundred cases of double insurance 
every year (Anonymous 7 2011). 
Abolishing the distinction between agricultural and non-agricul-
tural hukou can create problems, as the example of D County illus-
trates. With this reform, the local government lost the basis for calcu-
lating NRCMS enrolment rates and formulating enrolment targets. 
Instead of being able to give grassroots cadres a target rate for agri-
cultural population participation (৲ਸ⦷, canhelü), they had to operate 
with an absolute number of expected enrollees (ᓄ৲ਸӪᮠ, ying canhe 
renshu), which was based on the enrolment figures of previous years. 
Moreover, citizens were free to choose between the NRCMS and the 
URBMI. Wealthier farmers could enter the urban system, while poor 
urbanites could switch to the rural system; some might enrol with 
both and others might not be covered at all. So even while D County 
officially had 100 per cent NRCMS coverage, there may have been 
considerable gaps. This becomes a crucial problem when the distinc-
tion of hukou status is abolished on a larger scale (Anonymous 2 2010; 
State Council 2014). 
Rural-to-urban migrants are largely marginalised with regard to 
health insurance and the NRCMS. Those who stay in their registra-
tion jurisdiction are less affected, but even they may lose coverage 
during urbanisation and hukou reforms. Those who leave their juris-
diction without their families usually have to remain in the NRCMS, 
but there are often no approved NRCMS hospitals in their destina-
tion areas. Therefore, services consumed out of town either are not 
eligible for reimbursement, or reimbursement rates are lower than at 
approved hospitals and payment is conditional on administrative 
formalities such as referrals or deadlines (dds2088 2007; Zhao, Rao, 
and Zhang 2011). A migrant worker from Chongqing explained that, 
after seeking treatment in Hangzhou where he worked, he would only 
have three months to claim reimbursement back home (Anonymous 
13 2011). In order to fully benefit from the NRCMS, migrants usually 
have to return to their home locality (Zhao, Rao, and Zhang 2011).  
Landless farmers are another marginalised group of rural-to-
urban migrants: they often lose their land and rural hukou in the 
course of urbanisation, but may not gain access to urban social pro-
tection or the urban labour market. They account for a substantial 
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share of the non-hukou population enrolled in the NRCMS, most 
notably in Western China. In Eastern China, they could often remain 
in the NRCMS due to less strict regulations. Local governments in 
Western China arguably often resort to informal practices to have 
people without a rural hukou insured instead of non-hukou migrants, 
who left a claim to transfers behind with their registration. Landless 
farmers and people born beyond the birth control quotas are both 
potentially marginalised by the systemic interdependence (Fu and 
Wang 2009). 
Policy Options for the Coverage of Migrant 
Workers
Urban–Rural Integration of Health Insurance 
The following sections explore strategic policy experiments with 
health insurance that improve the coverage of migrant workers. Local 
governments’ motives for such experiments are not always easy to 
pin down precisely, but they are generally a mixture of their own 
economic self-interest, the requirements of bureaucratic evaluation 
systems, and the preferences of political elites and patrons in the 
higher levels of government. Experiments that pioneer new policy 
options are often conducted in a socio-economic context conducive 
to them, or they constitute solutions to policy problems emerging 
from local circumstances or specific configurations of the local policy 
agenda (cf.: Heberer and Trappel 2013; Heilmann 2008). 
In 2008 a joint document issued by the MoH and the Ministry of 
Finance called for experiments to link up the NRCMS and the 
URBMI in order to improve the health protection of migrant work-
ers, landless farmers, and other special groups (MoH and MoF 2008). 
However, the NRCMS and URBMI were administered by two differ-
ent lines of administration, and the coordination between social in-
surance departments and NRCMS bureaus was often difficult and 
ineffective. The urban–rural integration (෾ґаփॆ, chengxiang yiti-
hua) of health insurance administration and funds creates conflicts 
over financial resources and competences, which can undermine the 
readiness of the two administrations to cooperate and thus weaken 
the effectiveness of the reforms. Administrative integration provides 
crucial institutional support for the integration of agricultural and 
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non-agricultural hukou status. As the following paragraphs will show, 
different localities have engaged in competing experiments with ur-
ban–rural integration at different degrees under the competing line 
bureaucracies of the MoH and the MoHRSS. 
Among the earliest to implement experiments in urban–rural in-
tegration policies were the counties of Suichang and Tonglu, and the 
prefecture-level city of Jiaxing in Zhejiang Province in 2003 and 2004. 
Suichang and Tonglu delegated the administrative responsibility for 
the NRCMS to their urban social insurance bureaus. Both the 
UEBMI and the NRCMS were based on common regulatory stand-
ards. Enhancing the administrative capacity of the social insurance 
bureaus was deemed more efficient than establishing dual administra-
tive structures and did not require very large investments in capacity, 
as both counties had comparatively small rural populations. Jiaxing 
City, by comparison, had begun to abolish the distinction between 
agricultural and non-agricultural hukou in 2002 (Jiaxing Government 
2002). Lacking an administrative basis for determining the boundaries 
of a regular NRCMS, everyone with a local hukou who was not cov-
ered by the UEBMI was eligible for enrolment in the “Urban–Rural 
Citizens’ Cooperative Medical Insurance” (෾ґት≁ਸ֌५⯇؍䲙, 
chengxiang jumin hezuo yiliao baoxian), as the local system was called. 
Both approaches solved basic problems associated with hukou reform 
and urbanisation, and both depended on cooperation between the 
bureaus of health and social insurance, which had potentially oppos-
ing interests. But in Jiaxing, this cooperation arguably only extended 
to avoiding double insurance under the UEBMI, whereas in Tonglu 
and Suichang the cooperation of rural healthcare providers under the 
jurisdiction of the bureau of health was crucial for the functioning of 
the NRCMS. Integration under the MoHRSS bureaucracy is, how-
ever, arguably more vulnerable to obstruction by the health bureau-
cracy than vice versa (Jiaxing Online News 2012; Shao 2007: 118–152). 
When the URBMI was launched in 2007 under the jurisdiction of the 
MoHRSS, its latent conflict with the MoH intensified (State Council 
2007). At that time, 71 county-level jurisdictions in 11 provinces had 
already put NRCMS administration under their social insurance bur-
eaus or had initiated the transfer to take place within that year (Wang 
et al. 2009). Both ministries subsequently sponsored programmes of 
research into urban–rural integration within their respective jurisdic-
tions. Table 2 lists some important sites of experimentation, and dif-
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ferentiates between mere administrative integration and more fully 
integrated insurance systems. The cities of Chengdu and Chongqing 
were highly visible due to their experimental policies. They also re-
presented the most influential approaches: Chengdu’s approach fo-
cused on administrative integration and was similar to that of Sui-
chang and Tonglu, with social insurance bureaus managing various 
insurance systems for urban residents, rural residents, and migrant 
workers. Tianjin adopted a similar approach. Chongqing, meanwhile, 
followed the Jiaxing approach that aimed to create an integrated sys-
tem (Anonymous 9 2011; Anonymous 3 2011). 
Then, in 2008, the government of Qinghai decided to have the 
URBMI managed by bureaus of health at the county level, with the 
exception of three larger cities. Urban populations in rural Qinghai 
were very small and the administrative resources were perceived to be 
too scarce for dual administrative structures. Huzhu County became a 
pilot for this approach: the funds and names of the insurance systems 
were kept separate, but they were governed by the same administra-
tive committee and management office, and key administrative and 
financial processes were integrated. But according to an MoH re-
searcher, the experiment was abandoned after two years because the 
MoHRSS intervened and directly pressured the provincial leadership 
to put a halt to it and to operate the URBMI separately. Xiangfen 
County in Shanxi Province took a similar approach, which likewise 
was subsequently abandoned due to unsatisfactory local outcomes 
(Anonymous 3 2011). 
Other localities also experimented with the integration of health 
insurance funds under the jurisdiction of the social insurance bureaus, 
though this approach was taken rather seldomly. Taicang City in 
Jiangsu Province integrated the NRCMS and the URBMI in 2007 
under the jurisdiction of the social insurance bureau, which was also 
in charge of the UEBMI and a separate health insurance programme 
for landless farmers. Urbanisation was the main reason for the inte-
gration of the insurance systems: in the course of economic devel-
opment, most of the local farmers had become urban citizens and the 
differences between urban and rural populations had decreased sub-
stantially. The resulting Citizens’ Health Insurance (ት≁५⯇؍䲙, 
jumin yiliao baoxian) featured the same level of premiums and the same 
benefits for all of the insured. The city of Dongguan in Guangdong 
Province also stands out for integrating the UEBMI, URBMI, and 
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NRCMS into one insurance system that was open to migrant workers 
and to residents. Due to its high economic dependence on migrant 
labour, Dongguan became a pioneer of integration: it had opened its 
basic health insurance system to workers without a local hukou as 
early as 2000. In 2004 it established an integrated health insurance 
system for agricultural and non-agricultural hukou holders, and in 
2008 it integrated both systems into one social insurance system with 
equal benefits for all (Anonymous 9 2011). 
Table 2. NRCMS and URBMI Integration Experiments up until 2011 
 Administrative integration Insurance integration 
MoHRSS line 
administration 
Chengdu City (Sichuan) 
Tianjin City 
Taicang City (Jiangsu) 
Dongguan City (Guangdong) 
MoH line 
administration 
Huzhu County (Qinghai) 
Xiangfen County (Shanxi) 
Jiaxing City (Zhejiang) 
Chongqing City 
Sources: Anonymous 9 2011; Anonymous 3 2011. 
In 2013 the MoH officially lost jurisdiction over the NRCMS to the 
MoHRSS in the course of governmental reforms, during which the 
MoH was integrated with the National Population and Family Plan-
ning Commission to form the National Health and Family Planning 
Commission (NHFPC) (State Council 2013). However, the imple-
mentation of this change in jurisdiction appears to have been delayed, 
and the NHFPC continued to co-author important administrative 
documents for the NRCMS in 2014. The MoHRSS-based approach 
integrated the administration of all major health insurance systems, 
and thus provided a better basis for the ongoing hukou reforms (State 
Council 2014). The urban–rural integration of health insurance is 
crucial to overcoming the systemic interdependence between hukou 
and health insurance at the administrative level. At the programme 
level, it reduces the interdependence in terms of target population 
and financing in a local context, thus avoiding double insurance and 
coverage gaps due to hukou reforms and urbanisation. 
Extending the Network of Approved Hospitals 
In recent years, it has become common for the NRCMS to cover 
services consumed out of town, but reimbursement rates are often 
lower and the respective regulatory guidelines problematic. After the 
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NRCMS was launched in 2003, only services from the home county 
were eligible for reimbursement because the approved NRCMS pro-
viders were local county hospitals, township health centres, and in-
creasingly also village doctors (State Council 2003). Up until 2008, the 
decision to extend coverage to services provided to migrant workers 
outside their home counties was largely at the discretion of county 
governments. In particular, those sending counties with large migrant 
populations had an incentive to cover out-of-town services, which 
were usually reimbursed at lower rates than those of the approved 
providers (Klotzbücher and Laessig 2009). Local NRCMS regulations 
often remained restrictive and, in 2009, the central government em-
phasised the need for premium collection and reimbursement regula-
tions to be better adapted to migrant workers’ needs (MoH et al. 
2009). 
The extension of the network of approved hospitals beyond the 
boundaries of the home county is crucial to facilitating the access of 
migrants to healthcare. The most common direction, along which this 
extension has developed, is up the hierarchy of public hospitals. 
NRCMS counties started integrating hospitals at the city and provin-
cial levels so that patients with severe illnesses could access these 
medical facilities via referrals. This process was usually accompanied 
by the establishment of NRCMS offices at the higher administrative 
levels. A second approach was to establish multilateral NRCMS pro-
vider networks between the counties and districts within one prefec-
tural-level city. Such networks require investment in the development 
of digital systems of administration for the NRCMS and usually result 
in the introduction of integrated electronic health cards (а঑䙊, yi ka 
tong), which can be used at all providers within the network. H City 
established one such multilateral network. According to an NRCMS 
administrator in C District, rural citizens could have their health ser-
vice costs reimbursed at home rates all over the city if they went to 
approved NRCMS hospitals (Anonymous 7 2011). However, the 
approved providers were not always rated very highly: one villager 
explained that he thought the care provided by the approved hospi-
tals in H City to be substandard and said that he would prefer to seek 
treatment at a private hospital, which was not eligible for reimburse-
ment (Anonymous 8 2011). In 2013, 90 per cent of NRCMS pooling 
districts already had some approved providers outside their jurisdic-
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tions and 61 per cent were developing yi ka tong initiatives (Chinese 
Government 2014). 
Another approach to extending coverage was the bilateral exten-
sion of the provider network across prefectural and provincial 
boundaries. Gushi County in Xinyang City, a prefectural-level city in 
Henan Province, was one of the pioneers of this approach. Gushi 
had an estimated overall population of approximately 1.6 million 
people, of whom about 500,000 were migrant workers permanently 
residing outside the county. Gushi implemented the NRCMS in 2005, 
and in the following year the county started to contract hospitals in 
those localities with the highest concentrations of its migrant work-
ers, including Beijing, where about 150,000 migrants from Gushi 
lived. Most of the contracted hospitals were private, while the local-
approved hospitals were usually public. For example, Changfeng 
Hospital in Beijing specialised in providing medical services to mi-
grant workers. As an approved NRCMS provider, the hospital be-
came more popular with migrant workers and was thus keen to ac-
cept Gushi County’s conditions regarding pricing, even offering vari-
ous discounts. The reimbursement processes here were more compli-
cated than in the home county: migrant workers seeking treatment 
first had to place a deposit of CNY 5,000 at the hospital, which 
would be returned to them on leaving, after out-of-pocket payments 
had been deducted. The NRCMS bureau in Gushi transferred a total 
amount of CNY 50,000 from its NRCMS funds to Changfeng Hospi-
tal. The latter used this prepayment to channel reimbursements to the 
migrant workers directly after they received treatment. This mecha-
nism left the hospital in charge of a part of the financial administra-
tion, and it left the NRCMS bureau in Gushi the option of not send-
ing further funds to the hospital as a sanctioning mechanism. It was 
said to save Gushi’s migrant workers about CNY 3 million in traffic 
costs and other expenses a year. In 2014 Changfeng Hospital became 
a contracted provider for all NRCMS pooling districts in Xinyang 
City, and an outpost NRCMS office was installed in the facility that 
came to be in charge of the reimbursements. Furthermore, Henan 
provincial authorities planned to establish a second migrant worker 
hospital in Beijing in cooperation with the local health and social 
security departments (Sunflower 2011; Xinhua 2007; Zhongmin 2014). 
As early as 2007, the innovation was recommended for applica-
tion in other areas by the central government (MoH, MoF, and TCM 
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Administration 2007). There are, however, several factors limiting the 
applicability of Gushi’s approach: with regard to largely tax-funded 
and partly locally financed programmes like the NRCMS, local gov-
ernments have a strong preference for those funds to benefit their 
local economy rather than be funnelled into the economies of other 
localities, and to benefit their own public hospitals, rather than private 
hospitals. The higher levels of health costs in the receiving localities 
could result in an outflow of resources from the rural to the urban 
areas. Furthermore, the Gushi approach requires relatively stable and 
concentrated migrant populations; where migrants are scattered and 
mobile, the approach would be ineffective (Sunflower 2011; Zhongmin 
2014). 
Extending approved provider networks can resolve much of the 
programme-specific systemic interdependence regarding enrolment, 
approved hospitals, and claiming reimbursement in the context of 
local, small-distance migration systems or strongly concentrated bilat-
eral migration systems. In recent years, the central government has 
increasingly called for provincial NRCMS networks to be linked on a 
national level in order to facilitate cross-border reimbursement, which 
indicates that the difficulties of crossing provincial boundaries are still 
considerable (NHFPC 2014). 
City-Level Pooling 
In 2008 the central government also called for experiments with city-
level pooling (ᐲ㓗㔏ㆩ, shiji tongchou) in the NRCMS under the juris-
diction of the health bureaucracy: areas with a relatively small rural 
population or otherwise favourable conditions were encouraged to 
centralise pooling and administration at the city level (MoH and MoF 
2008). The term shiji tongchou should be interpreted carefully, however, 
as it is sometimes used ambiguously to mean a harmonisation of 
NRCMS regulations within a city rather than actual centralisation. T 
City in Inner Mongolia followed the central government’s call and 
centralised the NRCMS. Preparations took place in 2008 and 2009: 
calculations and forecasts were conducted, the different NRCMS 
regulations of the localities were harmonised, and a new NRCMS 
administrative centre under the jurisdiction of the city bureau of 
health was established. In 2010 the NRCMS insurances of the coun-
ty-level jurisdictions – urban districts, banners, and counties – were 
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integrated into one system with one integrated fund (Anonymous 5 
2011). 
The administrators in T City listed several reasons for this en-
deavour. Many of the county-level jurisdictions had very few rural 
citizens, some as few as 10,000 to 20,000 people. Their NRCMS 
funds were small and unstable. They offered comparatively little risk 
protection and their relative administrative costs were comparatively 
high. While each villager paid the same amount in premiums, reim-
bursement rates differed between districts. Most funds were managed 
conservatively and some districts retained very high surpluses prior to 
centralisation. Furthermore, there was substantial internal migration 
within the city’s boundaries, as many people came from the vast, but 
sparsely populated rural areas to the urban districts to work. Before 
centralisation, the county-level governments decided whether and 
how migrants could participate in the NRCMS. Migrant workers 
would need a referral to seek treatment at a city hospital outside their 
home county, and received lower reimbursement rates for treatment 
at such facilities (Anonymous 5 2011). 
After the centralisation of the NRCMS, every rural citizen in T 
City could have their health services reimbursed at the same rate re-
gardless of which NRCMS-approved hospital in the entire city area 
they had visited. The enhanced administrative capacity of the city-
level administration facilitated the extension of direct reimbursement 
for inpatient and outpatient services; villagers would only have to pay 
out of pocket for their co-payments, rather than paying for the entire 
amount first and seeking reimbursement later. This arrangement is of 
particular advantage to the poorer strata of the population, for whom 
high out-of-pocket payments constitute a barrier to access to health-
care. Furthermore, NRCMS premiums could also be paid throughout 
the entire city jurisdiction: to a village committee, a hospital, or an 
NRCMS bureau (Anonymous 5 2011; Anonymous 6 2011). 
Fieldwork was conducted during the second year of centralisa-
tion, when this type of approach was still very unusual. The govern-
ment of Inner Mongolia subsequently mandated the extension of 
city-level pooling throughout the entire autonomous region (IM 
Health Department 2010), and the central government subsequently 
called for an extension of city-level pooling and further experiments 
with centralisation at the provincial level (NHFPC and MoF 2013). 
City-level pooling was found to ease the systemic interdependence 
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considerably regarding enrolment, financing, approved hospitals, and 
reimbursement in the context of a prefectural city, and potentially 
even at the provincial level in some areas. However, city-level pooling 
is arguably difficult to apply in Jiangsu and other provinces that han-
dle public finance affairs directly between the provincial and county 
level, thus bypassing the cities. Some cadres in A County were very 
reluctant to believe that the centralisation of the NRCMS at the city 
level was even possible. Even in provinces like Shandong, where the 
city plays a more influential role, the centralisation of NRCMS funds 
sparked substantial conflicts of interest. In Z City, for example, one 
county was much wealthier than the others, so equalising insurance 
standards would have required it to lower its reimbursement rates 
and/or to share its wealth with the poorer counties around it, a factor 
which city-level NRCMS administrators highlighted as the greatest 
obstacle to city-level pooling. Thus, it was arguably the administrative 
particularities and the comparatively good economic development of 
T City that facilitated this experiment (Anonymous 1 2010; Anonym-
ous 2 2010; Anonymous 5 2011; Anonymous 11 2011). 
Conclusion 
The hukou system has provided a comparatively stable institutional 
foundation for the NRCMS, which has allowed health insurance to 
be extended to the vast majority of China’s citizens at comparatively 
low costs. But the tight connection between the NRCMS and hukou 
also exerts substantial pressure on the NRCMS to adapt: in the con-
text of industrialisation and urbanisation, the hukou system is chang-
ing gradually but continuously, and this forces change on the 
NRCMS and on other areas of social protection and public service 
provision. The functional differentiation of the respective administra-
tive structures, along with the fading of the urban/rural divide, shifts 
the logic of how hukou influences social stratification. Rather than 
assigning citizens to the rural or urban spheres of society, hukou is 
becoming increasingly important in tying them to their locality of 
origin (Chan and Buckingham 2008).  
The conceptual lens of systemic interdependence has provided 
in-depth insights about the institutional mechanics between hukou 
and the NRCMS, and how they affect the health insurance coverage 
of migrant workers. The inertness of core institutions of social ad-
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ministration to adapt to rapid socio-economic change facilitates the 
social marginalisation of rural-to-urban migrants, who largely fall 
through the gaps in social protection. Conversely, the reason that 
migrant workers are marginalised with regard to social protection is 
not so much the hukou system itself, but the systemic interdepend-
ence of hukou and social protection in the context of China’s decen-
tralised polity – that is, the role it plays in the institutional context. In 
its classic form, the hukou system assigned migrant workers to the 
NRCMS and undermined their coverage at the same time. Policy 
approaches meant to close the gaps in health insurance coverage for 
migrant workers attempt to do so by loosening the systemic interde-
pendence, while the reforms of the hukou system arguably allow the 
rural population to enter the URBMI in their home locality. 
As a rule of thumb, the higher the administrative level of the 
boundaries crossed during migration, the greater the difficulties of 
extending coverage to those migrants. Local governments prefer 
NRCMS reimbursements to benefit their local economy and finance 
local hospitals, unless the share of migrants evading premium collec-
tion negatively affects coverage rates, or the small size of the rural 
population makes NRCMS ineffective and expensive to administrate. 
In short-distance migration systems within the boundaries of a pre-
fectural city, the local governments of the sending and receiving areas 
are under the common jurisdiction of the same city government, 
which can use its influence to find solutions. 
More research is needed to assess how broadly approaches such 
as urban–rural integration, the extension of approved provider net-
works, and city-level pooling can be applied in rural China. For the 
NRCMS programme, the administrative dimension of systemic inter-
dependence is being abolished with the centralisation of competences 
at the MoHRSS. On the programme level, the problems of access to 
approved hospitals, reimbursement, and, to a lesser extent, premium 
payment in the destination locality appear solvable with the available 
policy options, at least within city and provincial boundaries. The 
financial interdependence – the connection between financial trans-
fers for social protection and the hukou system – is a more difficult 
issue to resolve. Recent proposals to experiment with commercial 
insurance companies as carriers of public insurance systems may 
provide an alternative, as such companies can be expected to have 
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less trouble with cross-border financial operations than state organs 
(NHFPC 2014). 
The social marginalisation of migrants depends largely on the 
trajectory and destination of their movement. Those moving to 
smaller cities can register and socially integrate more easily than those 
who move to larger cities. Those who remain within their locality of 
registration remain eligible for social protection and public services, 
and those who remain within their native province are more likely to 
receive extended coverage of some sort. Migrants crossing provincial 
boundaries arguably face the biggest problems. In the absence of 
effective nationwide health insurance networks, a strategy of double 
insurance via social or migrant insurance alongside the NRCMS may 
be the most effective way to ensure their coverage. 
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